A nation must think before it acts.
As the new Trump administration formulates its China strategy, defining clear end states will be essential to avoid a reactive or incoherent approach. A long-term rivalry with a peer competitor like China demands more than tactical responses—it requires a strategic vision that outlines what success looks like across all domains of great power competition.
As the new Trump administration formulates its China strategy, defining clear end states will be essential to avoid a reactive or incoherent approach. A long-term rivalry with a peer competitor like China demands more than tactical responses—it requires a strategic vision that outlines what success looks like across diplomatic, military, and technological domains. In any major competition, it is not enough to simply react to events; a successful strategy must be guided by a clear vision of the desired end state. For US policymakers managing the long-term rivalry with China, defining what “success” looks like is critical. Without a coherent end goal, American strategy risks becoming reactive, fragmented, or dangerously escalatory.
This month, FPRI’s Asia Program asked leading experts to explore what the ideal end state for Washington’s China policy should be. Connor Fiddler argues the US must adopt containment as its core China strategy across diplomacy, defense, and technology. Jaehan Park revisits the insights of Nicholas Spykman, arguing that active engagement to preserve buffer states remains essential. Aaron Glasserman proposes that instead of chasing an elusive grand bargain, the United States should focus on building trust gradually through many smaller, pragmatic agreements. Takuya Matsuda advocates for a flexible but narrowly defined objective: maintaining peace and regional stability without drifting into unnecessary confrontation. Brendan Flynn stresses the need to manage the competition with China carefully—aiming to deter aggression and strengthen US resilience without expecting dramatic breakthroughs under Xi Jinping’s leadership.
Together, their perspectives offer a valuable roadmap for thinking more clearly—and strategically—about America’s long-term approach to China.
As China’s ambitions expand, its tactics are becoming increasingly aggressive. In recent months alone, Beijing has normalized large-scale military drills around Taiwan, intensified unfounded territorial claims against the Philippines, escalated provocative gray zone activities targeting South Korea and Japan, and circumnavigated Australia while conducting live-fire naval exercises as a show of intimidation. US policy cannot change China’s behavior or ambitions, so it must focus on containing it. The United States should focus its containment strategy on three critical power centers: geopolitical, military, and technological.
First, the United States has to build broad and deep relationships with countries to isolate Beijing diplomatically. Washington should expand economic engagement, smart development aid, and security assistance not only to critical allies like NATO and Japan, but also to nations like Indonesia, Kenya, and Brazil. Many countries want American partnership, but they will turn to China if antagonized.
Second, the new administration should dramatically expand deterrence capabilities in the Indo-Pacific to contain Chinese power. While the forward deployment of US military assets remains critical, Washington must also think creatively and urgently about expanding co-development, co-production, and co-sustainment of military platforms and munitions with its allies. Joint production of Tomahawk and Patriot missiles, naval warships, drones, and other critical assets would bolster the strained US defense industrial base, expand allied warfighting capacity, and strengthen deterrence by ensuring capabilities are deployed and sustained within the region. By building a preponderance of allied power, the United States raises the risks for Beijing to pursue its revisionist goals.
Finally, Washington needs to contain Chinese technological advancements. Unlike the Soviet Union, China hosts some of the leading technology companies and has the ability to compete with and beat the United States in the technology race. Chip export controls and crackdowns on Chinese Internet protocol theft are important, but the United States needs to be more proactive in actively undermining Chinese technological advancements. Through a robust civil-military fusion campaign, Beijing has harnessed private sector technology for military capabilities. Policymakers need to be more aggressive in utilizing tools like the entity list to restrict Chinese access to American technology and know-how.
Containment must be the foundational objective of US strategy. Every pillar of American power—diplomacy, military, and technology policy—should be aligned to effectively constrain China’s ambitions, not just counter or respond.
Nicholas J. Spykman was arguably one of the greatest geopolitical minds of the twentieth century. As America entered World War II following Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor, the Dutch-American political scientist laid out a blueprint for US foreign policy in his magnum opus, America’s Strategy in World Politics.
Presaging modern realists, Spykman observed that in a world “without central authority,” the primary objective of statecraft is to preserve and improve one’s power position. This was in turn determined by military strength and geography: latent power is a function of size, resources, and world location, and regional location defines potential adversaries. To prevent competitors from becoming too powerful by way of unchecked expansion, the statesman must protect borders and buffers.
What did this mean practically? Because the Old World dwarfed the New World in terms of power potential, Eurasia’s domination by a single or few powers would result in an effective encirclement of America. Moreover, Eurasian powers would meddle in the Western Hemisphere to create problems for the United States. To prevent such outcomes, Spykman argued, against the dominant isolationist strand, America should actively participate in the balance of power of Eurasia. Geopolitically, this meant preserving buffer states in its littorals, especially in Europe and Asia—what would be posthumously termed the “rimland.” In the following years, America would largely follow Spykman’s prescription.
There are ominous parallels between Spykman’s times and ours: multiple wars are ongoing in different theaters, much as World War II began as several border wars nested in larger regional conflicts; America’s adversaries are forming a loose coalition of sorts—what some analysts have called “CRINK” (China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea)—reminiscent of the Axis powers; they have been challenging American power not only in Eurasia, but also in the Americas; and isolationism is growing in the United States.
What would Spykman say? The dead don’t talk. One can imagine, however, that he would have called for the preservation of lesser states along China’s periphery—and America’s active statecraft to that effect. As this year marks the 80th anniversary of World War II, it is worth revisiting Spykman’s case for America’s involvement in Eurasia.
The ideal end state for the US-China relationship is engagement that promotes 1) peace and security through alliance-based and unilateral deterrence; 2) human rights through compliance with international law and criticism and prosecution of human rights violations and other crimes; and 3) prosperity and human flourishing through commercial, scientific, and cultural exchange. The Trump administration’s upending of global trade and erosion of American credibility jeopardize item 1, while its attack on liberal norms and institutions at home and abroad are directly at odds with item 2. Major policy changes on both fronts are urgently needed but unlikely to happen under present circumstances. The prospects for item 3 are less clear.
Efforts to achieve a “grand bargain” with China are misguided for two reasons. First, political
realities in both countries make negotiating and complying with a broad deal impossible. Both sides have reasons to doubt whether the other would live up to any agreement. Moreover, the best case for a deal could probably be made for Chinese investment in the American green economy, but Trump is making support for green anything politically toxic. Second, even if an economically appealing grand bargain were politically viable, it would likely involve unwise and unethical commitments by the United States to refrain from human rights criticism and security cooperation with allies and partners.
Rather than aiming for an unattainable and restrictive grand bargain, policymakers should focus on creating the conditions for many small deals in the private sector, especially in the green economy, which has potential for growth and job creation and does not necessarily involve national security issues. Small-scale investment and joint ventures that prove beneficial to local communities can be models for future collaboration. If even minimal mutual trust is to be restored, it will only happen gradually and from the bottom up—not in one fell swoop from the top down.
It is still possible to have a relationship with China that brings prosperity to both sides without ceding ground on human rights and security for allies and partners. The question is whether we are willing to work for it.
The Trump administration has demonstrated its intent to maintain a tough stance on China. There has indeed been an emerging bipartisan consensus to treat China as a strategic competitor since the mid-2010s. The US perception of China has also changed significantly in the past two decades. What is the most effective long-term approach for the administration to manage relations with Beijing?
Despite the temptation to pursue a grandiose approach, Washington will benefit from a prudent approach by keeping the desired end state for its China policy flexible yet as narrowly defined as possible. For instance, preventing a major conflict between the United States and China while maintaining the regional territorial status quo is a political objective that would likely continue to dictate US policy. The reason behind this is twofold.
First, US-China policy needs to resonate across time and geography. The US-China strategic competition is a generational challenge. The grand strategic shift to pivot to the Asia-Pacific from the Middle East, for instance, took almost a decade to implement due to different bureaucratic hurdles. As such, the guiding political objective would be most effective if it could inform US strategy in the long run. Relatedly, shaping China’s behavior requires close coordination with US allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to operationalize deterrence by denial and resilience. An achievable and reasonable endgame that resonates across time and geography is thus crucial for the US-China policy to be successful.
Moreover, as the administration seemingly pursues a hard stance against Beijing, it is important to be mindful how specific US policies may influence China’s strategic calculations. China’s economic slowdown, in fact, makes this point salient. It takes two to tango. Deterrence works best through the right combination of strength and assurance. It is especially useful to recall that the main source of tension across the Taiwan Strait is essentially political. A combative policy may inadvertently jeopardize Taiwan’s security and fuel escalation that could result in armed conflict. A narrow and specific endgame may assist the administration in maintaining the prudence that this situation requires.
There should be no grand bargain between the United States and China during Xi Jinping’s tenure. Xi is a committed Marxist who genuinely believes in historical laws, including the inexorability of China surpassing the United States. There is little the United States can do to disavow Xi of his often-proclaimed view regarding “The Rise Of The East, And The Fall Of The West.”
Xi’s optimism is not entirely delusional. While China has formidable economic and demographic challenges, its sheer scale and productive capacity are stunning. China’s manufacturing output exceeds that of the United States, Japan, Germany, and India combined. And the release of DeepSeek is a powerful reminder that China meets or surpasses the United States on a range of critical technologies. In short, Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi are correct: China is “the most formidable competitor the United States has ever encountered.”
The good news is that US power is also unrivaled. With 11 carriers, more than 700 bases in roughly 80 countries, and an annual defense budget approaching $1 trillion, the US military is peerless in its control of the global commons. Further bolstered by NATO and alliance relationships across the first island chain from Japan past the Philippines, even the British Empire pales in comparison. The United States is also poised to maintain its status as the world’s leading economy and source of innovation.
How should the most powerful state in history confront its most powerful challenger? The United States should aim to “win” the competition with China in the same way it prevailed in its last great power competition: by managing it. Prevent Chinese territorial revisionism and war through ally-supported deterrence, while fortifying American industrial capacity and other weaknesses. Lowering the temperature over Taiwan while maintaining deterrence is this strategy’s greatest challenge.
The only other great power rivalry as unprecedented as this is the previous one, when the United States and the Soviet Union waged the first global competition overshadowed by nuclear weapons. The United States should aim for a similar outcome. Eventually, China’s new leaders will conclude Xi’s Marxist teleology was wrong and accommodate themselves to America’s unique staying power.
Image: A Chinese navy vessel is seen on a giant screen showing news footage about joint army, navy, air and rocket forces drills around Taiwan by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), outside a shopping mall in Beijing, China, April 1, 2025. REUTERS/Florence Lo